Fair Division Minimizing Inequality by Aleksandrov, Martin et al.
Fair Division Minimizing Inequality
Martin Aleksandrov
TU Berlin
martin.aleksandrov@tu-berlin.de
Cunjing Ge
Chinese Academy of Sciences
gecj@ios.ac.cn
Toby Walsh
Data61, CSIRO
toby.walsh@data61.csiro.au
Abstract
Behavioural economists have shown that people are
often averse to inequality and will make choices to
avoid unequal outcomes. In this paper, we con-
sider how to allocate indivisible goods fairly so
as to minimize inequality. We consider how this
interacts with axiomatic properties such as envy-
freeness, Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness.
We also consider the computational complexity of
computing allocations minimizing inequality. Un-
fortunately, this is computationally intractable in
general so we consider several tractable greedy on-
line mechanisms that minimize inequality. Finally,
we run experiments to explore the performance of
these methods.
Introduction
In resource allocation, one of the most frequently used nor-
mative measures of fairness is envy-freeness (no agent en-
vies another’s allocation). Unfortunately, when the resources
are indivisible, envy-free allocations may not exist. In ad-
dition, computing an envy-free allocation when it exists is
computationally intractable. Another desirable property in
resource allocation is Pareto efficiency. In contrast to envy-
free allocations, Pareto efficient allocations always exists and
can be computed quickly. However, Pareto efficient alloca-
tions may not be very fair (e.g. giving all items to a single
agent is Pareto efficient). We consider here whether min-
imizing the inequality between agents offers an alternative
to envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency for the fair division
of indivisible items. A number of different measures of in-
equality have been proposed in economics (e.g. [Gini, 1912;
Atkinson, 1970; Hoover, 1936]). We focus on the Gini index
as it has been commonly used in many other settings. How-
ever, it would be interesting to consider other measures such
as the Atkinson, and Hoover (aka Robin Hood) indices.
Our results: We start our paper with a motivating exam-
ple. We consider three normative inequality measures for fair
division: the Gini index, the subjective Gini index and the
envy index. These three indices measure the quality of al-
locations and mechanisms between perfect equitability and
envy-freeness. Unlike envy-free allocations which may not
exist, allocations that minimize these three measures always
exist. We study the relationship between the Gini, subjective
Gini and envy indices and envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency
and strategy-proofness. For example, we show that there
are fair division problems when none of the envy-free allo-
cations minimizes the inequality indices. We further study
the complexity of computing allocations minimizing each of
these indices. Unfortunately, most of these computational
problems are intractable. For this reason, we propose three
tractable online mechanisms that allocate each item in a given
sequence thus minimizing the three inequality indices without
the knowledge of the future items in the sequence. We finally
run experiments with these online mechanisms.
Formal background
We consider a fair division problem with n agents and m in-
divisible items. Each agent has some private cardinal utility
ui(oj) ∈ Q≥0 for each item oj but can submit a public cardi-
nal bid vi(oj) ∈ Q≥0 for each item oj . An instance of a fair
division problem thus has (1) agents a1, . . . , an, (2) indivisi-
ble items o1, . . . , om and (3) a bid matrix (vi(oj))n×m. LetA
be an allocation of items to agents. We writeAi for the bundle
of items allocated to agent i, and ui(B) for the utility to agent
ai of the items in the bundle B. We assume additive utilities.
That is, ui(B) =
∑
oj∈B ui(oj). In economics, incomes and
wealth are additive for the population. Also, in a food bank,
donated products are additive for the bank. Additivity offers
an elegant compromise between simplicity and expressivity
in our model as well as in many other theoretical models (e.g.
[Bevia´, 1998; Brams et al., 2003; Chevaleyre et al., 2008;
de Keijzer et al., 2009; Lesca and Perny, 2010]).
We consider welfare, fairness and efficiency notions. The
utilitarian welfare ofA is equal to
∑
i∈[1,n] ui(Ai). The egal-
itarian welfare of A is equal to mini∈[1,n] ui(Ai). An alloca-
tion A is envy-free iff ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Aj) for every i, j. An al-
locationA is Pareto efficient iff there is no other allocationA′
such that ∀i : ui(A′i) ≥ ui(Ai) and ∃k : uk(A′k) > uk(Ak).
We further consider only responsive mechanisms that com-
pute an allocation of items to agents based on their positive
bids. A desirable property of mechanisms is that they cannot
be manipulated. A mechanism is strategy-proof if, for each
instance, an agent cannot increase their utility by misreport-
ing their bids. We are interested in properties of the actual ex
post outcomes returned by mechanisms.
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One of the most frequently used measures of inequality is
the Gini index. It is commonly used to measure inequality
in income or wealth. The Gini index satisfies a number of
desirable properties such as anonymity, scale independence,
population independence, and the transfer principle (inequal-
ity reduces when we take from the rich and give to the poor).
We will use it here to measure inequality between agents in
the utility of the items allocated to them. More precisely, the
Gini index of an allocation equals half of the relative mean
absolute difference in utilities of the agents.
Gini =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |ui(Ai)− uj(Aj)|
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ui(Ai)
=
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |ui(Ai)− uj(Aj)|
2n
∑n
i=1 ui(Ai)
The Gini index lies in the interval [0,1], taking the value 0
when all n agents get the same utility, and 1 − 1n when all
but one agent get zero utility. In a plot of the cumulative
distribution, the Gini index measures the ratio of the area that
lies between the line of equality (i.e. all n agents get the same
utility) and the Lorenz curve [Endriss, 2013].
A motivating example
A simple example provides some motivation. Suppose Alice,
Bob and Carol arrive at the car hire office and are offered to
rent a Renault, a Skoda, or a Toyota car. Alice knows that
Skoda’s share their mechanicals with VW, and likes reliable
German cars, so she prefers the Skoda most. Bob is torn be-
tween the Skoda and the more unusual Renault. And Carole
loves quirky cars, so has a strong preference for the Renault.
She is also an environmentalist, so dislikes VW and has a
strong preference against the Skoda. Their precise utilities
for the different cars are given in the following table. Who
gets what car?
Renault Skoda Toyota
Alice 1 8 3
Bob 8 7 1
Carol 18 1 8
There is no envy-free allocation. Bob and Carol both most
prefer the Renault and only one of them can get it. The allo-
cation with the least amount of envy (either of one person for
another or in total) allocates the Renault to Carol, the Skoda
to Bob and the Toyota to Alice. This is also the optimal al-
location from a welfare perspective with both the maximum
utilitarian and egalitarian welfare. However, Alice might not
consider this allocation fair as she gets less than half the util-
ity of Bob or Carol, as well as less than half the utility of her
most preferred car, whilst Carol gets her most preferred car
and Bob gets a car with value close to his maximum utility.
We might decide instead that it is fairer to chose from
amongst those allocations which minimize the inequality be-
tween Alice, Bob and Carol. For instance, allocating the Re-
nault to Bob, the Skoda to Alice and the Toyota to Carole
is one such allocation. Everyone gives their car the same 8
units of utility. This allocation is Pareto efficient and has a
Gini index of zero, the minimum possible. In this allocation,
only Carol envies Bob, but since she gets as much utility for
her car as both Alice and Bob get for their cars, this might be
acceptable.
Note that there is another allocation that minimizes in-
equality. Allocating the Renault to Alice, the Skoda to Carol
and the Toyota to Bob gives everyone the same 1 unit of util-
ity. This also has a Gini index of zero. However, everyone
now has their least preferred car, and everyone envies every-
one else. Moreover, this allocation is not Pareto efficient and
has the minimal welfare possible, both from the utilitarian
and egalitarian perspective.
To sum up, this example suggests that whilst the Gini index
can help in choosing between allocations, we cannot mini-
mize inequality alone. Amongst allocations that minimize in-
equality, we might look to maximize welfare, minimize envy,
etc. Minimizing inequality does, however, have an advan-
tage over envy-freeness as a primary measure of fairness. An
allocation of indivisible items minimizing inequality always
exists whilst an envy-free allocation may not.
The subjective Gini index
As remarked earlier, the Gini index is typically used to mea-
sure inequality in income and wealth distribution. However,
we are concerned here with the distribution of indivisible
items not money, and importantly agents can have different
subjective utilities for these items. For example, the utility
you get for an item is not necessarily the same as the utility I
get for it.
Should it increase the “inequality” of an allocation that
someone else gets an item they value when you have little
or even no value for it? To return to our motivating exam-
ple, suppose Alice gets the Renault, Bob gets the Toyota, and
Carol gets the Skoda. Everyone gets 1 unit of utility so this
allocation has a Gini index of zero. But from everyone’s sub-
jective perspective, this is not a very equitable allocation of
items. For instance, from Alice’s perspective, rather than the
1 unit of utility she gets, she would get 8 units of utility for
Carol’s car and 3 for Bob’s. And from Bob’s perspective,
rather than the 1 unit of utility he gets, he would get 8 units
of utility for Alice’s car and 7 for Carol’s.
We propose the subjective Gini index to take such differ-
ences into consideration. We modify the definition of the Gini
index to sum the difference in utility an agent has for its allo-
cation and the utility the same agent has for the allocation of
items to other agents.
subjective Gini =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 |ui(Ai)− ui(Aj)|
2
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ui(Aj)
Like the Gini index, the subjective Gini index is between [0,1]
taking the value 0 when each agent gives the same utility to
each bundle of items, and 1− 1n when one agent gets all items.
Returning again to our motivating example, the allocation in
which each agent gets 1 unit of utility has a Gini index of 0
but a subjective Gini index of 23/55 (=0.41818181818). The
allocation in which each agent gets 8 units of utility might
be more preferred as it has a lower subjective Gini index of
37/110 (=0.33636363636).
The envy index
Minimizing the subjective Gini index will find allocations
which divide the items into bundles so that each bundle has
similar utility for each agent. This reminds us of a fairness
concept such as the maximin share when each agent’s utility
should be at least as high as the agent can guarantee by divid-
ing the items into as many bundles as there are players and
receiving their least desirable bundle [Budish, 2011].
On the plus side, an allocation which minimizes the sub-
jective Gini index always exists, unlike maximin fair shares
[Procaccia and Wang, 2014]. On the negative side, such an
allocation may not be envy-free. To overcome this, we pro-
pose also an envy index whose definition is closely related to
that of the subjective Gini index. This new index is focused
on the amount of envy in an allocation. Minimizing this index
will return an envy-free allocation when it exists.
envy =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1max{0, ui(Aj)− ui(Ai)}∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 ui(Aj)
The envy index is between [0,1] taking the value 0 when
the allocation is envy-free, and tending towards 1 as we in-
crease the number of agents and allocate all items to just one
agent. It is easy to see that the envy index is never greater (and
sometimes smaller) than the subjective Gini index. Returning
to our motivating example, the unique allocation minimizing
the envy with index of 6/110 (=0.05454545454) allocates the
Renault to Carol, the Skoda to Bob and the Toyota to Alice.
As we noted, this is also the optimal allocation from a welfare
perspective with both the maximum utilitarian and egalitarian
welfare.
Relationship to envy-freeness
We consider how these indices relate to a fairness concept
such as envy-freeness. Suppose that an envy-free allocation
exists. Clearly, such an allocation minimizes the envy index.
On the other hand, envy-free allocations may not minimize
the Gini or subjective Gini indices.
Theorem 1 There exist problems with envy-free allocations
on which no envy-free allocation minimizes the Gini or sub-
jective Gini index.
Proof. Consider 2 agents and 2 items. Suppose the first agent
gives the first item a utility of 1 and the second a utility of 2,
whilst the second agent gives utilities of 3 and 1 respectively.
The only envy free allocation gives the first item to the second
agent and the second item to the first agent. However, the
unique allocation that minimizes the Gini index gives the first
item to the first agent and the second item to the second agent.
In this allocation, both agents envy each other.
Consider 3 agents and 3 items. Suppose the first agent has
a utility of 9, 1 and 5 for the items respectively, the second
agent has a utility of 5, 9 and 1 respectively, and the third
agent has a utility of 1, 5, and 9 respectively. Then the unique
envy-free allocation gives each agent their most valued item.
However, the unique allocation that minimizes the subjective
Gini index gives each agent their second most preferred item,
i.e. the one they value with utility of 5. 
The examples in the proof of Theorem 1 critically de-
pend on the agents not sharing common utilities for items.
When utilities are common, there is no incompatibility be-
tween envy-freeness and minimizing the Gini or subjective
Gini indices. If an allocation is envy-free and agents have
common utilities, then every agent must get the same utility
for every bundle of items.
Observation 1 With common utilities, an allocation is envy-
free iff the Gini and subjective Gini indices are zero.
Relationship to Pareto efficiency
Another fundamental notion in fair division is Pareto effi-
ciency. We would prefer allocations where no agent can im-
prove their outcome without making others worse off. Pareto
efficiency is not necessarily compatible with minimizing in-
equality. The first example in the proof of Theorem 1 shows
that Pareto efficiency and the Gini index are incompatible.
This should perhaps not be surprising as other fairness prop-
erties are also incompatible with Pareto efficiency. For ex-
ample, an allocation that is envy free may not necessarily be
Pareto efficient. Moreover, each envy-free allocation can be
Pareto dominated only by allocations that are not envy-free
[de Keijzer et al., 2009]. It follows quickly that minimizing
the envy index is not compatible with Pareto efficiency. We
can show that the same is true for the subjective Gini index.
Theorem 2 There exist problems on which no Pareto efficient
allocation minimizes the subjective Gini index.
Proof. Consider 2 agents and 4 items. Suppose the first agent
gives items o1, o3 a utility of 1, item o2 a utility of 2 − 
and o4 a utility of , whilst the second agent gives utilities of
2− , 1, , 1 to o1, o2, o3, o4 respectively. Then the only allo-
cation minimizing the subjective Gini index allocates o1, o3
to the first agent, and o2, o4 to the second agent. However,
the only Pareto efficient allocation swaps items o1, o2, giving
o1 to the second agent, and o2 to the first agent. 
Again, with common utilities, there is no incompatibility
between Pareto efficiency and minimizing the Gini, subjec-
tive Gini and envy indices. This follows because each allo-
cation, including those that minimize these indices, is Pareto
efficient.
Observation 2 With common utilities, any allocation mini-
mizing the Gini, subjective Gini or envy index is Pareto effi-
cient.
We can measure the trade-off between Pareto efficiency
and minimizing one of these indices. The egalitar-
ian/utilitarian price of an index for a given welfare is the ratio
between the best welfare of any Pareto efficient allocation and
the worst welfare of an allocation minimizing the index.
Theorem 3 The utilitarian and egalitarian prices of the Gini
and subjective Gini indices are unbounded.
Proof. Consider 2 agents, 2 items and let  < 12 . Suppose
the first agent gives item o1 a utility of  and o2 a utility of
1 − , whilst the second agent gives utilities of 2 −  and 
respectively. Then the Pareto efficient outcome with the best
utilitarian and egalitarian welfare allocates o1 to the second
agent, and o2 to the first agent. However, the only allocation
that minimizes the Gini index does the reverse. The egalitar-
ian price of the Gini index is then 1− which is unbounded
as  goes to zero. The utilitarian price is 3−22 which is un-
bounded as  goes to zero. The same example demonstrates
that the utilitarian and egalitarian price of the subjective Gini
index are also unbounded. 
For the envy index, we have examples where the utilitarian
price grows as the number n of agents. We conjecture that
this may also be an upper bound. For the egalitarian price,
we can show that the price is unbounded.
Theorem 4 The egalitarian price of the envy index is un-
bounded.
Proof. Consider 3 agents, and 3 items. Suppose the first
agent gives a utility of 1 to each item, and both the second and
third agents gives utilities of 8, 4, and 4 respectively to the 3
items. The Pareto efficient outcome with the best egalitarian
welfare allocates the item with utility 8 to the second or third
agent, and each of the remaining items to one of the other
agents. This has an egalitarian welfare of 1 unit. However,
the allocation that minimizes the envy index gives the item
with utility 8 to the second agent, both the other items to the
third agent, or vice versa. As the first agent gets no items, this
has an egalitarian welfare of zero units. Hence, the egalitarian
price of the envy index is unbounded. 
Relationship to strategy proofness
If we use a mechanism that minimizes one of these indices,
agents have an incentive to declare false utilities. Again,
this should not be too surprising. We often need to choose
between fairness and strategy-proofness. For example, the
random priority is strategy-proof but it can return allocations
which are not envy-free [Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001].
Theorem 5 A mechanism which minimizes the Gini, subjec-
tive Gini or envy index is not strategy proof.
Proof. For the Gini index, consider the first example from
proof of Theorem 1. If agents sincerely report their utilities,
the first agent gets o1 and the second agent gets o2. If the first
agent misreports their utilities as 1/2 and 3 respectively, the
agents swap items, and both agents are better off. Similarly
if the second agent misreports their utilities as 2 and 1/2 re-
spectively, the agents swap items, and both agents are better
off.
For the subjective Gini index, consider 2 agents and 4
items. Let the first agent have utilities u11 = 1, u12 =
3/2, u13 = 1, u14 = 1/2 whereas the second agent have util-
ities u21 = 3/2, u22 = 1, u23 = 1/2, u24 = 1. Suppose
sincere play. The mechanism that minimizes the subjective
Gini index gives to each agent both items for which they have
utility 1, or both items for which they have utility 3/2 and
1/2. The expected utility of each agent is then 2. Suppose
next that the first agent reports utilities 1, 3/2, 0, 0 respec-
tively. The mechanism now gives the first and second items
to the first agent and the third and fourth items to the second
item. The utility of the first agent increases to 5/2.
For the envy index, we can use the same instance as for the
subjective Gini index. 
Computational complexity
In this section, we turn our attention to computational proper-
ties of the Gini, subjective Gini and envy indices. Computing
envy-free allocations is NP-hard even with just 2 agents, and
common utilities [Bouveret and Lang, 2008]. It immediately
follows that finding an allocation minimizing the envy index
is NP-hard. The proof from [Schneckenburger et al., 2017]
showing that minimizing the Atkinson index is NP-hard can
be reused to prove that finding an allocation that minimizes
the Gini or subjective Gini index is NP-hard.
One way to deal with this intractability is to use algorithms
that are fast enough for small values of n or m [Bliem et al.,
2016]. Another way is to identify some tractable cases. For
example, with n agents and n items, minimizing the subjec-
tive Gini or envy index is polynomial. Each envy-free allo-
cation (whenever it exists) minimizes the envy index. Each
envy-free allocation with common utilities (whenever it ex-
ists) minimizes the subjective Gini index. Interestingly, min-
imizing the Gini index is also polynomial in this case. For
each utility value u, consider the instance in which only the
utilities equal to u are left. Each envy-free allocation in this
instance minimizes the Gini index. Computing allocations
minimizing the indices in this setting with n agents and n
items takes O(n5/2) time [Hopcroft and Karp, 1973].
Online mechanisms
Another approach to deal with the intractability of computing
allocations that minimize inequality or envy is to use greedy
online mechanisms. These will often return an allocation with
little inequality or envy, even if there is no guarantee that it
is minimal. Online mechanisms are also applicable when the
allocation problem is itself online [Aleksandrov and Walsh,
2017a; Mehta, 2013; Mattei et al., 2017]. We consider three
online randomized mechanisms. These mechanisms can be
applied to an offline problem by picking an (perhaps random)
order of the items. WLOG, let o = (o1, . . . , om) be such an
order. Each mechanism computes a set of agents feasible for
each next oj in o given an allocation Aj−1 of o1 to oj−1. A
feasible agent then receives oj with probability that is uni-
form with respect to the other feasible agents.
• GINI: this decides that ai is feasible for oj if vi(oj) > 0
and Aj−1 ∪ {(ai, oj)} minimizes the Gini index
• SUBJECTIVE GINI: this decides that ai is feasible for
oj if vi(oj) > 0 and Aj−1 ∪ {(ai, oj)} minimizes the
subjective Gini index
• ENVY: this decides that ai is feasible for oj if vi(oj) >
0 and Aj−1 ∪ {(ai, oj)} minimizes the envy index
A powerful technique to study online mechanisms is com-
petitive analysis [Sleator and Tarjan, 1985]. This has recently
been applied to online fair division [Aleksandrov and Walsh,
2017b]. Competitive analysis identifies the loss in efficiency
due to the data arriving in an online fashion. An online mech-
anism M is c-competitive for a given welfare w iff there ex-
ists a constant b such that, whatever the order o of items,
w(OPT) ≤ c·w(M, o)+b holds wherew(M, o) is the welfare
of M on o and w(OPT) is the optimal offline welfare.
A mechanism that is c-competitive has a ratio c. Most of
the ratios of our mechanisms are unbounded. For example,
we can use the instance from the proof of Theorem 10 in
[Aleksandrov et al., 2015] and show that both the utilitarian
and egalitarian ratios of SUBJECTIVE GINI are unbounded.
We next prove similar results for GINI and ENVY.
Theorem 6 The utilitarian and egalitarian competitive ra-
tios of GINI are unbounded.
Proof. For GINI, consider the online fair division of items
o1, o2 to agents a1, a2. Let the first agent have a utility 1 for
o1 and  for o2 whilst the second agent have a utility  for o1
and 1 for o2 where  > 0. The mechanism allocates o1 to a2
and o2 to a1 and thus returns utilitarian and egalitarian wel-
fares of 2 and . The optimal offline allocation allocates o2
to a2 and o1 to a1 and thus returns utilitarian and egalitarian
welfares of 2 and 1. The competitive ratios are equal to 1
which goes to∞ as  goes to zero. 
Theorem 7 The utilitarian competitive ratio of ENVY is at
least n2 whilst its egalitarian competitive ratio is unbounded.
Proof. For the utilitarian ratio, consider n agents and n items.
Let the first agent have utility n for each item, and each other
agent have utility 1 for each item. Then ENVY will allocate
the first item to the first agent, and then each subsequent item
to a new agent. The utilitarian welfare of this allocation is
2n− 1. The optimal utilitarian welfare is n2.
For the egalitarian ratio, consider the online fair division of
items o1, o2 to agents a1, a2. Let the first agent have a utility
1 for each item whilst the second agent have a utility  for
o1 and 0 for o2 where  > 0. The mechanism allocates both
items to the first agent, and thus returns an egalitarian wel-
fare of 0. The optimal offline allocation gives to each agent
an item they like, and returns egalitarian welfare of . The
egalitarian ratio is∞. 
We can also measure the price of anarchy of these online
mechanisms. The price of anarchy is closely related to the
competitive ratio but now supposing agents act strategically
[Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Aleksandrov et al.,
2015]. The price of anarchy of an online mechanism for a
given welfare is the ratio between the best welfare of an al-
location when agents are sincere and the worst welfare of an
allocation when agents are strategic. Interestingly, the price
of anarchy of each of our online mechanisms is at least to n.
We conjecture that this may also be their upper bound.
Theorem 8 The utilitarian and egalitarian prices of anarchy
of GINI, SUBJECTIVE GINI and ENVY are at least n.
Proof. Consider an instance with n agents and n items. For
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let ai has utility of 1 for oi, and utility of
 > 0 for each other item. The optimal offline allocation
gives to each ai their most valued item. The utilitarian and
egalitarian welfares of this allocation are n and 1 respectively.
We start with GINI. At round 1, this mechanism gives the
first item to one of the agents who likes with it . The first
agent then has an incentive to report  for this item simply
because they do not know what items will arrive next. By a
similar argument, at round 2, the optimal play for the second
agent is to bid , and so on for each other round. At the end of
the allocation, each agent gets expected utility of 1n +
(n−1)
n .
The utilitarian and egalitarian welfares of this strategic allo-
cation go to 1 and 1n respectively as  goes to zero. The prices
are consequently at least n.
We next consider SUBJECTIVE GINI. The sincere play is
optimal for each agent with this mechanism because they get
each item with probability 1n . The welfares go to 1 and
1
n
respectively as  goes to zero. The prices are at least n.
We finally consider ENVY. This mechanism tends to allo-
cate each item to agents with the highest utility for this item.
By similar arguments as for GINI, we conclude that the opti-
mal play of each agent is to bid 1 for each item. Each agent
thus gets expected utility of 1n +
(n−1)
n . 
Despite the fact that these mechanisms are not competitive
supposing agents act sincerely, they become more compet-
itive supposing agents act strategically. Moreover, each of
these mechanisms does as well as any other online mecha-
nism at minimizing their respective index. An online mecha-
nismM1 is ex post optimal for a given index iff, for each other
online mechanism M2, each online problem and each alloca-
tion A2 returned by M2, there exist an allocation A1 returned
by M1 such that the index of A2 is at least the same as the
index of A1. We show ex post optimality only for GINI. The
proof for the other two mechanisms can similarly be done by
analogy.
Theorem 9 The GINI mechanism is ex post optimal for the
Gini index.
Proof. Suppose that GINI is not optimal. Hence, there is
another online mechanismM , an online problem and an allo-
cationAM such that the index ofAM is strictly lower than the
minimum index of an allocationAGINI returned by GINI. This
means that there is a round j ∈ (1,m] at whichAM andAGINI
differ for item oj but coincide for items o1 to oj−1. Let Aj−1
denote the allocation of o1 to oj−1 inAM andAGINI. WLOG,
let M allocate oj to a1 whereas GINI allocate it to a2 given
Aj−1. We have that the Gini index of Aj−1 ∪{(oj , a1)} with
M is lower than the Gini index of this allocation with GINI.
Hence, GINI does not minimize this index given Aj−1. This
is a contradiction with the definition of GINI. 
Finally, Theorems 6 and 7 suggest that, in the worst-case,
these online mechanisms have performance that cannot be
bounded, whereas the Theorem 8 suggests that no other on-
line mechanism can do better.
Experiments
We ran an experiment to see how these online mechanisms
would perform in practice. We generated 100 instances of
n = 5 agents, m ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100}
items and integer utilities drawn uniformly at random from
{0, 1, . . . ,m}. For each combination of n and m, we com-
puted the Gini index, the subjective Gini index, the envy in-
dex, the egalitarian welfare and the utilitarian welfare of 100
000 sampled allocations returned by GINI, SUBJECTIVE GINI
and ENVY. We report in our graphs only the average results
because their standard deviations were less than 1% of them.
We further omit our results for the subjective Gini index for
reasons of space.
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In the first graph, GINI achieves the lowest value of the
Gini index for each number of items. For example, the Gini
value of GINI is nearly 50% lower than the Gini values of
SUBJECTIVE GINI and ENVY for 100 items. This gap ac-
tually remains almost the same for any number of items in
our experiment. Unfortunately, GINI fails to minimize envy.
In the second graph, we could clearly see that ENVY outper-
forms GINI. In fact, ENVY achieves an envy index of almost
0 for 100 items. Interestingly, SUBJECTIVE GINI tends to fa-
vor envy-freeness to equitability. Moreover, the performance
of GINI diverges from envy-freeness and converges to per-
fect equitability with more items. Perhaps, we observe this as
GINI tends to allocate items to agents with low utilities. In
contrast, SUBJECTIVE GINI and ENVY tend to allocate items
to agents with great utilities. They thus tend to minimize si-
multaneously both the envy and inequality.
We next report our results for the utilitarian and egalitar-
ian ratios. The utilitarian/egalitarian ratio is the ratio between
the utilitarian/egalitarian welfare returned by an online mech-
anism and the optimal offline utilitarian/egalitarian welfare.
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From a utilitarian perspective (the first graph), ENVY out-
performs the other two mechanisms for each number of items.
For example, this mechanism achieves a utilitarian ratio close
to 0.7 for 100 items. This value is nearly 16% higher than the
ratio of SUBJECTIVE GINI and 100% higher than the ratio
of GINI for 100 items. From an egalitarian perspective (the
second graph), again ENVY outperforms SUBJECTIVE GINI
and GINI, followed closely by SUBJECTIVE GINI. Interest-
ingly, for each number of items, ENVY not only minimizes
the envy but also maximizes the egalitarian welfare. For 100
items, its egalitarian ratio is nearly 0.95. This value is nearly
82% higher than the value of GINI for 100 items. For both
welfares, the performance of SUBJECTIVE GINI is close to
the performance of ENVY.
Finally, our experimental results indicate that envy-
freeness, equitability and welfare efficiency may be achiev-
able in practice.
Related work
Endriss has formulated the task of reducing inequality as a
combinatorial optimisation problem [Endriss, 2013]. In par-
ticular, he studied the problem of deciding if there exists an
inequality reducing improvement such as a Pigou-Dalton or
Lorenz transfer. The complexity of such decision problems
depends on the language used to represent the (possibly non-
additive) utilities. He also provided a modular mixed inte-
ger programming formulation that returns an allocation to
minimize inequality measures such as the Gini and Hoover
indices when utilities are specified with the XOR-language.
Schneckenburger, Dorn and Endriss [Schneckenburger et al.,
2017] consider allocating indivisible goods to minimize in-
equality as measured by the Atkinson index. They demon-
strated that a sequence of local deals would converge on a
globally optimal allocation with the minimum Atkinson in-
dex possible, but that the number of agents and items involved
in such deals could not be bounded. For the Gini index, they
conjectured that such convergence would be very challenging
if not impossible to achieve.
By comparison, we show that computing allocations with
small inequalities might be fast in practice. Moreover, none
of these works relates to other axiomatic properties. For ex-
ample, [Aziz et al., 2015] studied a taxonomy of fairness con-
cepts related to envy-freeness and proportionality. However,
there are fair division problems in which even the weakest of
these concepts may not exist, whereas allocations minimizing
our indices always exist. Moreover, the Gini index is charac-
terized in [Sanchez-Perez et al., 2012]. The subjective Gini
and envy indices are inspired by two measures of envy that
are analysed in [Bosmans and O¨ztu¨rk, 2018]. However, the
idea of measuring envy was first proposed in [Feldman and
Kirman, 1974].
Conclusions
We defined three new indices that measure the quality of allo-
cations: the Gini, subjective Gini and envy indices. The first
two indices measure inequality within an allocation, whilst
the third index measures the amount of envy. Each index
could be used as a second order criterion in choosing between
allocations. For example, we could choose the Pareto effi-
cient allocation with the least value of an index. Unlike envy-
free allocations which may not exist, allocations that min-
imize these three indices always exist. We studied the rela-
tionship of these indices with envy-freeness, Pareto efficiency
and strategy-proofness. We further studied the complexity
of computing allocations minimizing each of these indices.
Unfortunately, most of these computational problems are in-
tractable. For this reason, we proposed three tractable online
mechanisms that greedily minimize these three indices. Ex-
periments showed that, even for modest sized problems, we
may be able to efficiently compute allocations with limited
inequality or envy as well asl with reasonably high values of
the egalitarian and utilitarian welfares.
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